State v. Carswell: The Whipsaws of Backlash by Spindelman, Marc
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 24 Following Marriage 
January 2007 
State v. Carswell: The Whipsaws of Backlash 
Marc Spindelman 
Ohio State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marc Spindelman, State v. Carswell: The Whipsaws of Backlash, 24 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 165 (2007), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/8 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 










State v. Carswell: 
The Whipsaws of Backlash 
Marc Spindelman∗ 
For Shannon Hitchcock 
 
When, late in April 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to hear 
State v. Carswell1—a case in which the court will decide whether 
Ohio’s recently enacted “Marriage Amendment”2 abolishes the 
protections unmarried victims of domestic abuse currently receive 
under state law3—it set the stage to deliver cultural conservatives 
some bad news. Virtually no matter how the court rules, they will 
lose, setting back their efforts in Ohio and elsewhere to pass and 
enforce anti-gay marriage amendments, as well as the larger 
 
 ∗ Copyright © 2007 by Marc Spindelman. Associate Professor of Law at The Ohio 
State University’s Moritz College of Law. Thanks to: Susan Appleton, who offered the 
occasion; Martha Chamallas, Charlotte Croson, Larry Garvin, Chris Geidner, Catharine 
MacKinnon, Jim Madigan, Eric Resnick, Alexandria Rudin, Peter Swire, and Adam Thorburn, 
who were generous with reactions (and, in a few instances, provocations) of various sorts; Matt 
Steinke, law librarian extraordinaire, who over and over again put in hand materials needed to 
stay on top of what was happening with Ohio’s Marriage Amendment; Natalie Corvington and 
Lauren Fontana, for careful and timely research assistance; Ebony Mobley, Malako Hampton, 
and Jenny Pursell, for administrative support; and Elizabeth Engdahl, for deft editorial 
suggestions on an earlier, and substantially different, version of the ideas presented here, 
published as The Honeymoon’s Over, LEGAL TIMES (Wash., D.C.), June 12, 2006, at 66. In 
significant part, this work grows out of my analysis of Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), published as Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s 
Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361 (2005); see id. at 1392–96 (discussing Ohio’s Marriage 
Amendment, then known as “Issue 1”). In the interests of full disclosure, I have discussed State 
v. Carswell with various parties to the case. 
 1. See State v. Carswell, No. 06-0151 (Ohio argued Dec. 12, 2006).  
 2. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11. 
 3. To date, the appellate decisions rejecting this claim outrun those accepting it. The trial 
courts were initially split, practically down the middle, on the issue. For a breakdown of both 
the appellate and lower court decisions, see Appendix.  
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reclamation project of which they have been (and are) a part: the push 
to redistrict the law as a zone of traditional morality.4 
Though Carswell is a case of nationwide significance, it should be 
of particular interest in the dozen or so other states with equally harsh 
marriage amendments on their constitutional books.5 It appears to be 
 
 4. See Michelle Goldberg, “Homosexuals Are Hellbound!”, SALON.COM, Oct. 18, 2004, 
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/10/18/gayohio/index.html (linking the campaign to 
enact Ohio’s Marriage Amendment to broader struggles by cultural conservatives as part of the 
“ongoing” culture wars). 
 5. For the time being, the states (Ohio aside) that have some kind of constitutional 
“marriage amendment” are: (i) those that adopted one before 2004: Alaska, ALASKA CONST. 
art. I, § 25; Hawaii, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; Nebraska, NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; and Nevada, 
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; (ii) those that adopted one in 2004: Arkansas, ARK. CONST. amend. 
LXXXIII, § 2; Georgia, GA. CONST. art. I, § 4; Kentucky, KY. CONST. § 233a; Louisiana, LA. 
CONST. art. XII, § 15; Michigan, MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; Mississippi, MISS. CONST. art. XIV, 
§ 263A; Missouri, MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; Montana, MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; North 
Dakota, N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; Oklahoma, OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; Oregon, OR. CONST. 
art. XV, § 5a; and Utah, UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29; and (iii) those that have adopted one since 
2004: Alabama, ALA. CONST. amend. DCCLXXIV; Colorado, COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; 
Idaho, IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28; Kansas, KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16(a); South Carolina, S.C. 
CONST. art. XVII, § 15; South Dakota, S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; Tennessee, TENN. CONST. art. 
XI, § 18; Texas, TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; Virginia, VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; and Wisconsin, 
WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13. Of these, a number have provisions that look like they could 
function as the provision at issue in Carswell has. See, for example, Arkansas’s, ARK. CONST. 
amend. LXXXIII, § 2 (“Legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or substantially 
similar to marital status shall not be valid or recognized in Arkansas, except that the legislature 
may recognize a common law marriage from another state between a man and a woman.”); 
Kentucky’s, KY. CONST. § 233a (“A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of 
marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized.”); Louisiana’s, LA. CONST. 
art. XII, § 15 (“No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall construe this constitution or 
any state law to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any 
member of a union other than the union of one man and one woman. A legal status identical or 
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or 
recognized.”); Michigan’s, MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (“[T]he union of one man and one woman 
in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any 
purpose.”); Nebraska’s, NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (“The uniting of two persons of the same sex 
in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid 
or recognized . . . .”); North Dakota’s, N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 (“No other domestic union, 
however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially 
equivalent legal effect.”); Oklahoma’s, OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35 (“Neither this Constitution 
nor any other provision of law shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal 
incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.”); South Carolina’s, S.C. 
CONST. art. XVII, § 15 (“This State and its political subdivisions shall not create a legal status, 
right, or claim respecting any other domestic union, however denominated. Nothing in this 
section shall impair any right or benefit extended by the State or its political subdivisions other 
than a right or benefit arising from a domestic union that is not valid or recognized in this State. 
This section shall not prohibit or limit parties, other than the State or its political subdivisions, 
from entering into contracts or other legal instruments.”); South Dakota’s, S.D. CONST. art. 
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the first case in which a local court of final jurisdiction will 
substantively interpret a state constitutional marriage amendment 
passed as part of the backlash against the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court’s decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health,6 announcing a right to marry under the Commonwealth’s 
constitution that same-sex couples, just like their cross-sex 
counterparts, are free to enjoy.7 Without question, it will not be the 
last. 
Ohio’s Marriage Amendment, as marriage amendments elsewhere 
have been, was publicly sold as security against the ominous “threat” 
of same-sex couples gaily wed. As one official description of the 
 
XXI, § 9 (“The uniting of two or more persons in civil union, domestic partnership, or other 
quasi-marital relationship shall not be valid or recognized . . . .”); Texas’s, TEX. CONST art. I, 
§ 32 (“This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal 
status identical or similar to marriage.”); Utah’s, UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (“No other domestic 
union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or 
substantially equivalent legal effect.”); Virginia’s, VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (“This 
Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for 
relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance, or effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its political subdivisions 
create or recognize another union, partnership, or other legal status to which is assigned the 
rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.”); and Wisconsin’s, WIS. CONST. 
art. XIII, § 13 (“A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for 
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized in this state.”). Whether they will or not 
is another question. 
 6. 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). 
 7. Carswell may also be the first case in which a court of final jurisdiction substantively 
interprets any constitutionally grounded anti-gay marriage amendment, at least if the Hawaii 
Supreme Court’s last statement in Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1994 Haw. LEXIS 391 (Haw. 
Dec. 9, 1999), is put aside. Some may think that Baehr, unlike Carswell, involved no real 
interpretive question at all, because the meaning of the constitutional amendment it turned on 
was so thoroughly “obvious.” See id. at *6 (“The marriage amendment validated [the sex-based 
definition of marriage as the union of one man to one woman] by taking the statute out of the 
ambit of the equal protection clause . . . .”). I myself would say that the “obviousness” of the 
resolution of the interpretive dispute it involved did not render it a non-interpretive one. See 
Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REV. 359, 412 n.161 (2001) 
(challenging the notion of “plain meaning”); accord R. Stephen Painter, Jr., Reserving the 
Right: Does a Constitutional Marriage Amendment Necessarily Trump an Earlier and More 
General Equal Protection or Privacy Provision?, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 125, 127 n.14 (2005) 
(“The Hawaii court’s assumption that the marriage amendment removed the marriage 
prohibition from the ambit of the equal protection clause is striking, given the considerable 
legislative ambiguity on precisely this point.”); id. at 130 (“To write, as it did, without any 
discussion at all, that the Hawaii marriage amendment removed the same-sex marriage 
prohibition from the ambit of the state[’s] equal protection clause, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
obscured the range of interpretive possibilities [that the amendment presented].”); id. at 155 
n.111 (discussing the legislative history around Hawaii’s marriage amendment).  
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Marriage Amendment, then known as “Issue 1,” described it: Issue 1 
“establishes in the Ohio Constitution the historic definition of 
marriage as exclusively between one man and one woman as husband 
and wife,” hence “excludes from [it] . . . homosexual relationships 
and relationships of three or more persons.” More, to keep things that 
way, it “prohibits judges in Ohio from anti-democratic efforts to 
redefine marriage, such as was done by a bare majority of the judges 
of the Massachusetts Supreme Court [sic] which ordered that same-
sex ‘marriage’ be recognized in that state.”8 
To some, it has thus been surprising that Carswell itself is not a 
case about lesbians and gay men or their relational rights, but rather 
involves old-school, male-on-female domestic abuse.  
In February 2005, Michael Carswell was indicted on one count of 
domestic violence against Shannon Hitchcock, his live-in girlfriend at 
the time.9 According to a bill of particulars, he pushed Hitchcock’s 
head down “by her neck facing [her] to the floor causing injury to her 
neck, head, and leg.”10 In light of two prior domestic violence 
convictions,11 Carswell was charged with a third-degree felony under 
the law against domestic abuse.12 
In legal papers that sought to have the proceedings dismissed, 
Carswell ventured what was at the time a relatively novel legal 
proposition. The Marriage Amendment, he offered, barred the state 
from prosecuting him for domestically abusing Hitchcock, with 
whom he was, according to the domestic violence law’s operative 
 
 8. OHIO BALLOT BD., OHIO ISSUES REPORT: STATE ISSUE BALLOT INFORMATION FOR 
THE NOVEMBER 2, 2004 GENERAL ELECTION 2 (2004); see also Brief of the State of Ohio at 
15–16, State v. Carswell, No. 06-151 (Ohio July 13, 2006) (“The purpose of the Marriage 
Amendment is to recognize and define marriage, and to exclude from that recognition and 
definition any attempt to add gay marriage and civil unions.”). 
 9. Indictment, State v. Carswell, No. 05CR22077 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas Warren 
County Feb. 28, 2005); Bill of Particulars, State v. Carswell, No. 05CR22077 (Ohio Ct. 
Common Pleas Warren County Mar. 25, 2005). According to Judge Neal B. Bronson, the trial 
court judge in the case, “[i]t is . . . undisputed that the Defendant and the alleged victim were 
not married but were living together at the time of the alleged offense.” State v. Carswell, No. 
05CR22077, at 1 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas Warren County Apr. 12, 2005). 
 10. Bill of Particulars, supra note 9.  
 11. Indictment, supra note 9; Brief of the State of Ohio, supra note 8, at 2 n.2 (“The 
Defendant was previously convicted of domestic violence in October, 2001, and September, 
2002.”). 
 12. Indictment, supra note 9. 
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language, “living as a spouse.”13 The trial court credited this 
position,14 though it amended the felony domestic violence charge to 
a lesser-included offense of misdemeanor assault.15 That decision 
was subsequently reversed in a unanimous appellate decision.16 
Carswell then turned to the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to 
hear his case. 
To appreciate Carswell’s basic argument,17 including its legal 
force, it is useful to provide some context for both the Marriage 
Amendment and the state’s domestic violence law. 
Ohio’s Marriage Amendment is a sweeping piece of morals 
legislation. By design, it is an effort to leverage homophobia, 
particularly the anti-gay sentiment Goodridge roused,18 in order to 
brand the state’s constitution with the mark of traditional moral 
values. 
The amendment opens with a classic definition of marriage as the 
exclusive union of one man and one woman as husband and wife: 
“Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage 
valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions.”19 
But it then goes well beyond that to provide that traditional marriage 
 
 13. As the trial court explained, “The issue of dismissal is presented on a constitutional 
argument because of a recent amendment to the Ohio Constitution.” Carswell, No. 05CR22077, 
at 1 (footnote omitted). 
 14. Id. at 3–4. 
 15. Id. at 4 (“The within indictment is amended . . . to reflect the charge of Assault.”); see 
also Brief of the State of Ohio, supra note 8, at 3. 
 16. State v. Carswell, No. CA2005-04-047, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 5903 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 12, 2005). 
 17. Merit Brief of Appellant Michael Carswell at 1, State v. Carswell, No. 06-151 (Ohio 
June 16, 2006) (“The Appellant filed to dismiss the indictment due to the unconstitutionality of 
one specific provision of the domestic violence statute, defining ‘family or household member’ 
in terms of ‘living as a spouse,’ although neither the Appellant nor the alleged victim were ever 
spouses, that is, never entered into a marriage as defined by Ohio law. The Motion was based 
upon recent amendments to the Ohio Constitution that included a provision prohibiting the 
extension of legal benefits of spouses to unmarried persons.” (citation omitted)); see also id. at 
3 (“[T]he question before this Court now is only of the plain language of the Ohio Constitution, 
that simply states that unmarried persons can’t be given the benefits afforded to married 
persons, and couples who have undertaken the legal commitment to each other are to be 
afforded special protections that unmarried people, regardless of how they are living with each 
other, are not.”); see also generally id. at 3–8 (elaborating the argument). 
 18. See 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). For indications of the relation between Goodridge 
and Ohio’s Marriage Amendment, see supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 19. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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is to be the only intimate relationship created by, or recognized 
within, the state; no other is to be countenanced as such at law. In 
terms: “This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or 
recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that 
intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of 
marriage.”20 
Almost luckily (for Carswell, anyway), laws that address domestic 
violence, including Ohio’s, trace a similar conceptual trajectory: from 
marriage to other intimate relationships. These laws target what used 
to be called simply “wife beating,” a practice that once, not so long 
ago, was officially sanctioned under law as part of the right (and 
duty) of husbands to chastise their wives.21 Although wife beating 
was the classic image of domestic violence and remains its 
paradigmatic case, it proved, on empirical investigation, to be but one 
part of a much broader pattern of abuse that women suffered at the 
hands of men to whom they were intimately related.22 Written 
specifically to address these socially ignored (hence accepted) forms 
of sex-based violence, domestic violence laws were typically not 
limited to wife beating, but encompassed kindred forms of intimate-
partner abuse. (In Ohio, for instance, a late 1970s report by the 
Attorney General’s Task Force on Domestic Violence, which 
recommended law reform efforts on behalf of victims of domestic 
abuse, did not limit itself to wife beating or spousal abuse, but cast its 
net even more widely to pick up what it itself called “mate” abuse, a 
term that, as the report explained, “involves those spouses and those 
males and females living as spouses or who formerly resided in the 
 
 20. Id.  
 21. In practice, it often, if no longer “officially,” still is. For some of the history, see, for 
example, Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117 (1996); cf. ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 57–58 (1983) (quoting 
Victoria Woodhull on “marital rape and compulsory intercourse as the purpose, meaning, and 
method of marriage”). 
 22. Sources are legion. For some discussion of what I am calling the “marriage model” of 
domestic violence, see generally Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic 
Violence, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1841, 1851–57 (2006). For a recent assessment of the 
incidence and prevalence of the domestic abuse women suffer at the hands of the men to whom 
they are intimately related, see PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
NCJ 193781, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781. 
pdf. 
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same household as spouses, but are now divorced or separated.”23) 
Eventually, a number of jurisdictions, Ohio among them, extended 
protections against domestic violence to women and men in same-sex 
relationships, again, based on a wife-beating, hence, implicitly, a 
marriage model.24 
 
 23. TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, 
REPORT FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, at v (1977). 
All the same, much of the empirical evidence the Task Force drew on as the predicate for its 
proposals involved “battered wives” and the phenomenon of “wife beating.” See id. at 58–59 
(citing sources). 
 24. The operative cases in Ohio are State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1991) (reasoning, in light of legislative intent, that the domestic violence law, “does not in 
and of itself exclude two persons of the same sex.”), and State v. Yaden, 692 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (noting amendments to the domestic violence regime passed after 
Hadinger was decided, then venturing that “the legislature implicitly endorsed Hadinger when 
it declined to alter the definition of ‘cohabit’ to exclude same-sex couples”). See also State v. 
Linner, 77 Ohio Misc. 2d 22, 25 (Hamilton County Mun. Ct. 1996) (explaining that “[t]he 
better-reasoned analysis of the law reflects that Ohio’s domestic violence laws apply equally to 
all persons regardless of their gender. Any person of either sex who can prove that he or she 
‘otherwise is cohabiting’ with another person of either sex as a ‘family or household member’ is 
a person who is entitled to the protection of Ohio’s domestic violence laws.”). This rule has 
recently been reaffirmed. See, e.g., State v. Nixon, 165 Ohio App. 3d 178, 2006-Ohio-72, 845 
N.E.2d 544, 549 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (citing Hadinger and Yaden); State v. Burk, 843 N.E.2d 
1254, 1257 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (citing Hadinger); State v. Jenson, No. 2005-L-193, 2006 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5135, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2006) (citing Yaden and quoting 
Hadinger, in that order); State v. Rodriguez, No. H-05-020, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3289, at 
*20 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 2006) (citing both Hadinger and Yaden); State v. Goshorn, No. 
05CA2879, 2006 Ohio app. LEXIS 2593, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 23, 2006) (citing Burk and 
Hadinger). 
 Not all jurisdictions have domestic violence laws that are as (a-hem) progressive as Ohio’s 
is on this front. A recent opinion by the Attorney General of Virginia, Robert McDonnell, 
before Virginia’s Marriage Amendment was adopted, seems to suggest that Virginia law 
prohibits (or, more exactly, may prohibit) same-sex domestic violence, a prohibition that will 
not be altered by Virginia’s new Marriage Amendment: 
 . . . [W]hile the institution of marriage provides an illustrative and objective standard 
by which “cohabitation” may be identified by a trier of fact, the use of marriage as a 
comparative standard does not confer upon the cohabiting relationship any of the 
“rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage,” nor is it a recognition 
of a relationship “that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or 
effects of marriage.” Were such a construction plausible, a prosecution pursuant to 
§ 18.2-57.2 could not be maintained against an individual involved in an unmarried 
heterosexual relationship. Such [a] construction would implicitly recognize a common-
law marriage, which, like same-sex marriage, is not permitted in Virginia. In addition, 
in defining “family or household member,” the General Assembly specifically listed 
“spouse” in a distinct and separate subsection of § 16.1-228 and placed individuals 
who cohabit in another subsection. This distinct placement clearly indicates that the 
General Assembly wished to establish a new and distinct class of potential domestic 
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violence victims among unmarried, cohabitating persons other than spouses. Finally, 
customary legal usage also distinguishes between “cohabitation” and “matrimonial 
cohabitation.” Thus, Virginia’s existing law does not confer a legal right unique to 
marriage on another class of persons that might be invalidated by the marriage 
amendment, but rather creates five distinct classes of potential victims (other than 
spouses) of domestic violence. 
 It is my opinion that “cohabitation” is determined by a variety of factors, and that 
the institution of marriage may be used as an illustrative and objective standard to 
determine whether unmarried parties are cohabitating. Applying this standard pursuant 
to § 18.2-57.2 does not confer upon the cohabiting relationship any of the “rights, 
benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage,” nor is it a recognition of a 
relationship “that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or effects 
of marriage.” Passage of the amendment, therefore, would not prevent prosecution of 
an individual cohabitating in a same-sex or other unmarried relationship for assault 
and battery of the other individual pursuant to § 18.2-57.2. 
ROBERT F. MCDONNELL, ATT’Y GEN. OF VA., OFFICIAL ADVISORY OPINION # 06-003, at 11–
12 (2006), http://www.oag.state.va.us/OPINIONS/2006opns/06-003Newmanetal.pdf (footnotes 
omitted). The validity of Attorney General McDonnell’s opinion is rendered uncertain by, 
among other things, an opinion by one of McDonnell’s predecessors, Virginia Attorney General 
James S. Gilmore, III, squarely holding that same-sex domestic violence is not encompassed by 
the Commonwealth’s anti-domestic violence rules. Particularly noteworthy is Gilmore’s 
reasoning why: in light of the Commonwealth’s ban on same-sex marriage, same-sex couples 
cannot be assimilated into the domestic violence law’s marriage model. As his opinion 
explains:  
[W]hen the General Assembly used the term “cohabits” in defining who would be 
considered a “family or household member” [for purposes of the domestic violence 
law], it presumably was aware that the courts have interpreted that term to connote 
persons living together as husband and wife without being legally married. It also is 
presumed to have known of [the statutory prohibition of] marriages between persons 
of the same sex. In my opinion, therefore, the use of “cohabits” indicates a legislative 
intent that the definitions of “family or household member” in §§ 16.1-228 and 18.2-
57.2 encompass unrelated persons in the same household only if they are of opposite 
sexes and are living as husband and wife. If the General Assembly had intended those 
statutory definitions to encompass unrelated persons of the same sex, either in a 
homosexual relationship or merely as lodgers sharing a common dwelling, in my 
opinion, it would have used a broader term, such as “resides” instead of the limiting 
term “cohabits” in the applicable definitions in §§ 16.1-228 and 18.2-57.2. 
1994 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 60, 62 (on file with author). On this point, McDonnell’s opinion 
announces that Gilmore’s “has been superseded by [Cowell v. Commonwealth, No. 3198-02-1, 
2005 Va. App. LEXIS 42, *8–*9 (2005)] and the customary legal usage of the term 
‘cohabitation.’” MCDONNELL, supra, at 11 n.55. Though I do like the notion that Gilmore’s 
opinion has been reversed, and think it should be, I cannot see how it has been, based on Cowell 
or “the customary legal usage of the term ‘cohabitation.’” Id.  
 On a related note, Judith Smith has recently offered a snapshot of treatment of same-sex 
domestic violence under state laws. Her research indicates that five states deny domestic 
violence protections to same-sex couples: Delaware, Louisiana, Montana, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina. Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order 
Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 104 n.68, 106 n.82 (2005). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/8
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Drawing these two strands together, Carswell’s position can be 
summarized this way: The Marriage Amendment, which seeks to 
preserve the status of marriage as unique in law, bars the state from 
treating unmarried individuals like married individuals. The state’s 
domestic violence law does just that by extending unmarried 
individuals legal protections against intimate-partner violence as if 
they were married.25 Therefore, the Marriage Amendment invalidates 
the domestic violence law as applied to unmarried couples. As 
Carswell explained it to the Ohio Supreme Court: 
[T]he Ohio domestic violence statute, in attempting to protect 
unmarried persons the same as married persons, is 
incompatible with [Ohio’s Marriage Amendment] in that it 
provides recognition and therefore a legal status . . . to a person 
who is not married to the offender but is only ‘living as a 
spouse.’ That portion of the domestic violence statute is 
unconstitutional and this Appellant cannot be prosecuted under 
it.26 
 
 25. See, e.g., Merit Brief of Appellant Michael Carswell, supra note 17, at 7 (“In this 
context, it is clear that the domestic violence statute was intended to protect persons who were 
unmarried, as though they were in fact married.”). 
 26. See id. at 8. Neither here nor elsewhere in the briefs submitted in Carswell was any 
direct challenge to the Marriage Amendment’s definition of marriage as the union of one man 
to one woman mounted. Nobody—not even Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. 
(see generally Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Inc, in Support of Appellee State of Ohio, State v. Carswell, No. 06-151 (Ohio July 17, 
2006))—argued that that definition of marriage was unconstitutional under the federal 
constitution, or, notwithstanding the Marriage Amendment, under state law. The closest any 
brief comes to such an argument, and truthfully, it is not really all that close, is the Brief of 
Amici Curiae Action Ohio Coalition of Battered Women, Ohio Domestic Violence Network, 
and Ohio NOW Education and Legal Fund in Support of Appellee State of Ohio at 30 n.33, 
State v. Carswell, No. 06-151 (Ohio July 17, 2006) (“Although not directly on point, the federal 
court’s ruling that a state constitutional prohibition on same-sex civil unions or domestic 
partnerships violates the Equal Protection Clause certainly suggests that the even more radical 
Ohio Constitutional amendment if applied to exclude . . . same-sex couples or other unmarried 
couples from the legal protections of Ohio’[s] domestic violence statutes . . . is an even more 
egregious violation of equal protection.”). For some thoughts in the counterintuitive direction of 
suggesting that a constitutional Marriage Amendment may itself be unconstitutional (even a 
state constitutional marriage amendment under state constitutional law), see Painter, supra note 
7, at 129 (arguing that “the statutory canon of construction—that a later and more specific 
provision governs over an earlier and more general provision—is an uneasy fit in the 
constitutional context,” and that, in any event, such an amendment does not “automatically” 
settle the question whether there is a constitutional right to marriage—even under state law—
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Realities of non-enforcement aside,27 cultural conservatives who 
backed the Marriage Amendment at one point assured doubters they 
need not worry about prospects like these. Phil Burress, president of 
the Ohio group Citizens for Community Values (an affiliate of Focus 
on the Family), who ran the Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage,28 
which spearheaded the drive for the amendment, ridiculed concerns 
that it would nullify portions of the domestic violence law. Even after 
the amendment passed, he insisted that the idea that it would be 
dangerous for unmarried victims of domestic abuse was “on its face 
absolutely absurd” and “a lot of hypotheticals.”29 This posture struck 
 
that encompasses a right to same-sex marriage). Arguments on the potential for constitutional 
amendments themselves to be held unconstitutional are found in, for example, Charles A. 
Kelbley, Are There Limits to Constitutional Change? Rawls on Comprehensive Doctrines, 
Unconstitutional Amendments, and the Bases of Equality, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487 (2004); 
Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (1980); Jeff 
Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073 (1991), 
all cited in Painter, supra note 11, at 128–29 n.10; see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 238–40 (1993) (suggesting that not all constitutional amendments may themselves 
be constitutional); id. at 239 (“The successful practice of [the Constitution’s] ideas and 
principles over two centuries place restrictions on what can now count as an amendment, 
whatever was true at the beginning.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748 (2005); Brief of 
Amici Curiae The National Network to End Domestic Violence et al., Urging Affirmance at 
35–36, State v. Carswell, No. 06-151 (Ohio July 17, 2006) (“Despite the massive legal reforms 
that have occurred in the last century, and especially the past several decades, to transform the 
use of violence in the family into a crime, victims of abuse have continued to struggle with 
apathetic and sometimes even hostile courts. . . . The State’s role in perpetuating domestic 
violence through its ambivalent responses has been repeatedly acknowledged by important 
governmental bodies.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 28. Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens for Community Values, Urging Reversal at 1, State v. 
Carswell, No. 06-151 (Ohio June 19, 2006) (noting the formal affiliation). Citizens’ for 
Community Values’ President, Phil Burress, “organized and chaired the Ohio Campaign to 
Protect Marriage, the political action committee [that] successfully campaigned in favor of the 
passage of the [marriage] amendment.” Id. 
 29. Jim Nichols, Claim: Unwed Abuse Victims Left Unprotected Under Issue 1, PLAIN 
DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Jan. 15, 2005, at A1 (“Phil Burress, a leader in the drive to pass 
Issue 1, said the claim that it would undermine parts of the domestic-violence law ‘on its face is 
absolutely absurd.’ He dismissed the prospect of that as an unintended consequence as ‘a lot of 
hypotheticals.’”); see also Brian Albrecht, Issue 1 Conflicts with Domestic Abuse Law, Judge 
Says, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Mar. 24, 2005, at A1 (“Phil Burress of Cincinnati, a 
leader in the drive to pass Issue 1, said the domestic violence law needs to be amended ‘to bring 
about equal treatment,’ and noted that legislation to that effect has been introduced . . . . 
‘There’s nothing wrong with the constitutional amendment,’ he added. ‘If there’s any law 
contrary to the constitutional amendment, we will fix it.’”); Bruce Cadwallader, It’s Still 
Domestic Violence, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Columbus, Ohio), Mar. 26, 2005, at A1 (“‘These 
(domestic-violence) crimes should have the same penalty whether you’re married or not’ said 
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an intuitive chord. After all, what kind of “community values” 
initiative would help perpetrators, not victims, of domestic abuse? 
An unmistakable answer came in an amicus brief that Burress’s 
associate David Langdon, one of the original authors of the Marriage 
Amendment,30 submitted for Citizens for Community Values in State 
v. McIntosh.31 Like Carswell, McIntosh involved a constitutional 
 
Phil Burress.’”); M.R. Kropko, Gay Wedding Ban Tested, CINCINNATI POST, Feb. 4, 2005, at 
A1 (“Phil Burress . . . said the amendment . . . was never intended to change the state’s 
domestic violence law. . . . ‘We would fix the law and make sure the penalty for domestic 
violence is the same against everyone. It’s a crime. Physical abuse is illegal, period. I don’t see 
how you can beat up someone living with you and get away with it,’ Burress said.”).  
 30. See Carrie Spencer, Marriage Measure Raising Concerns, CINCINNATI POST, Oct. 4, 
2004, at A8 (describing Langdon as “the Cincinnati attorney who wrote the 55 words [of the 
Marriage Amendment] perplexing legal and political experts”). 
 31. Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens for Community Values, Urging Reversal, State v. 
McIntosh, No. CA 21093 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2005).  
 Another answer, in a related context, came in Phyllis Schlafly, Time to Address Domestic 
Violence Abuses, CONSERVATIVE VOICE, May 18, 2006, http://www.theconservativevoice.com/ 
article/14693.html, which savages the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”), mainly on the 
grounds that domestic violence abuses to which it is related, are abuses of and by the legal 
system, driven (of course) by feminist puppet masters, not the violence perpetrators actually 
commit. As she writes: 
 VAWA advocates assert that domestic violence is a crime, yet family courts often 
adjudicate domestic violence as a civil (not a criminal) matter. This enables courts to 
deny the accused all Bill of Rights and due process protections which are granted to 
the most heinous of criminals. 
 Specifically, the accused is not innocent until proven guilty but is presumed guilty, 
and he doesn’t have to be convicted “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Due process rights, 
such as trial by jury and the right of free counsel to poor defendants, are regularly 
denied, and false accusations are not covered by perjury law. VAWA provides funding 
for legal representation for accusers but not for defendants. 
 Those who are concerned about judicial activism, i.e., judges legislating from the 
bench, could observe judges doing this every day in domestic violence cases. Every 
time a judge issues a restraining order, the judge creates new crimes for which an 
individual can be arrested and jailed without trial for doing what no statute prohibits 
and what anyone else may lawfully do. 
 This criminalizing of ordinary [ordinary?] private behavior and incarceration 
without due process follows classic police-state practices. Evidence is irrelevant, 
hearsay is admissible, defendants have no right to confront their accusers, and forced 
confessions are a common feature. [And we all know we are against that.] 
 Some of these injustices result from overzealous law enforcement officials 
(sometimes running for office), and some from timid judges who grant restraining 
orders and deny due process to defendants for fear of being blamed for subsequent 
violence. Most of this, however, is the result of feminist activism and the taxpayers’ 
money given them by Congress. 
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challenge to the state’s domestic violence law in the wake of the 
Marriage Amendment. To the benefit of David McIntosh, the 
perpetrator in the case,32 Langdon’s brief maintains that the Marriage 
Amendment invalidates the domestic violence law because, in giving 
unmarried partners the same legal protections that spouses receive, it 
fails to recognize the unique legal status of marriage.33 Summarizing 
the point, the brief contends: “The problem with the domestic 
violence statute is that it creates a category of relationship for 
unmarried couples living as spouses,”34 a category that cannot be 
squared with the Marriage Amendment, which “intends that marriage 
remain unique in being the only state-recognized relationship of its 
type.”35 The same argument appears verbatim in the amicus brief 
 
 . . . . 
 VAWA money is used by anti-male feminists to train judges, prosecutors and the 
police in the feminist myths that domestic violence is a contagious epidemic, and that 
men are naturally batterers and women are naturally victims. 
Id. Schlafly obviously is not thinking about same-sex domestic violence here at all. Still, her 
commentary is reminiscent of the often forgotten traditionalist opposition to domestic violence 
legislation, on which a small refresher can be found in Colker, supra note 22, at 1852–53. 
 32. Not “alleged” in light of his “no contest” plea. Entry of Waiver and Plea(s) on 
Indictment; Entry and Order, State v. McIntosh, No 2004 CA 04712 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 
Montgomery County Apr. 28, 2005). 
 33. Unremarkably, both Langdon’s brief for Citizens for Community Values in McIntosh, 
Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens for Community Values, Urging Reversal, supra note 31, at 1–
2, and his brief for it in Carswell, Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens for Community Values, 
Urging Reversal, supra note 28, at 1–2, contain language of disavowal. As it appears in the 
Citizens for Community values’ brief filed with the Ohio Supreme Court in Carswell, which 
almost perfectly tracks the language from the McIntosh brief: 
 Because CCV’s purpose in this filing lies exclusively in advocating that the text of 
the Marriage Amendment be respected, and to resist the diminishing suggestions found 
in the lower courts[’] written decisions, it takes no position on the allegations lodged 
against Defendant in this case. CCV deplores and condemns as abhorrent the acts of 
assault which occur between those who share what should be a sanctuary: the home. 
CCV believes the law should contain stiff penalties for those who perpetrate assaults 
on individuals with whom they reside, and CCV looks forward to the state legislature’s 
remedial efforts extending the application of the domestic violence law to all those 
now covered under its terms, as well as other similarly situated vulnerable persons, and 
all in a manner which conforms to the Ohio Constitution. 
Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens for Community Values, Urging Reversal, supra note 28, at 1–
2. Precipitating the need for all this, of course, is the substantive position of the briefs to the 
benefit of the defendants in the cases.  
 34. Id. at 9. 
 35. Id. at 10. 
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Langdon wrote for Citizens for Community Values and gave to the 
Ohio Supreme Court in Carswell.36 
Needless to say, those “absolutely absurd” hypotheticals do not 
look either absurd or hypothetical any more. To some of us, they 
never did.37 
More significantly, by staking out this ground, conservative 
supporters of the Marriage Amendment have fenced themselves in. 
Should the Ohio Supreme Court reject the view that they have 
embraced in Carswell, it will set a powerful (and, from their 
perspective, troubling) precedent: The Marriage Amendment’s terms 
can, and in some instances, should, be changed, to protect battered 
women, along with other victims of domestic abuse, at the very least. 
This bodes ill, for instance, for efforts by cultural conservatives to 
eliminate the domestic partnership benefits that state universities 
(some, only very recently) have decided to provide to some 
unmarried employees, given for years as a matter of course (of 
course) to married full-time faculty and staff.38 If the Carswell court 
gives the Marriage Amendment a narrow (or narrowing) 
interpretation out of a recognition, tacit or not, that state protection 
against intimate-partner abuse is basic to human well-being, what 
principled grounds could there be for not doing the same thing where 
domestic-partnership benefits are concerned? Is their central aim—
providing health insurance to those in relationships who need it—not 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Carrie Spencer, Experts: Issue One Impact to Be Felt More in Homes than 
Workplaces, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, Nov. 3, 2004 (“Attorneys for unmarried clients 
charged with domestic violence ‘will trot out Issue 1 in service of their defense,’ [Spindelman] 
said.”). 
 38. Brinkman v. Miami University, 139 Ohio Misc. 2d 114 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 
Butler County 2006), was the first such case they brought. Though Brinkman was decided 
without reaching the merits of the case, id. at 27–28, its underlying question, which the trial 
court does address in dicta suggesting that providing domestic partnership benefits to unmarried 
couples, specifically same-sex couples, does not conform to Ohio’s Marriage Amendment, id. 
at 1 (“Arguably, Brinkman is correct” that “Miami’s policy violates the Ohio Constitution.”); 
id. at 23 (“Arguably, the state of Ohio, through its instrumentality or arm, Miami University, 
has done that which is constitutionally proscribed.”), seems likely to resurface if the standing 
problems which led to the dismissal in Brinkman can be overcome. See also Nat’l Pride at 
Work, Inc. v. Granholm, No. 05-000368-CZ, 2005 WL 3048040 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 
2005), rev’d, 732 N.W.2d 139 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007), appeal docketed, No. 133554 (Mich. 
May 23, 2007). 
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likewise basic to human well-being?39 What sense, moreover, would 
it make to hold that the Marriage Amendment permits the state to 
expend resources on punishing and incarcerating perpetrators of 
domestic violence who are not married to their victims, but that it 
may not help offset those same unmarried victims’ health care costs 
as part of a domestic partnership program? It is hard to see how any 
legal system based on the rule of reason could support such a 
distinction. 
As bad as it would be for cultural conservatives were the Ohio 
Supreme Court to reject the claim that the Marriage Amendment 
invalidates the domestic violence law as applied to unmarried 
couples, it would be worse for them in a way if it did not. Accepting 
that claim, along with its conclusion, impels the declaration in 
Carswell itself or some future case, that the Marriage Amendment, 
or, minimally, that bit of it directly at issue in Carswell, is itself 
unconstitutional.40 
 
 39. Though I happen to have in mind Martha Nussbaum’s “capabilities” approach, see 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 
(2000); see also Amartya Sen, Rights as Goals, in EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION: ESSAYS IN 
FREEDOM & JUSTICE 14, 15–16 (Stephen Guest & Alan Milne eds., 1985), I do not mean to 
weigh in here on whether, or if so, why, it may or may not be preferable to the approaches 
others have taken when elaborating the relation between social justice and health care. 
 40. Aware of this, Lambda’s brief in Carswell nevertheless urges the court to avoid this 
ruling, hence the declaration that the Marriage Amendment—or part of it—is unconstitutional: 
“Interpreting [the Marriage Amendment] so broadly as to preclude the ability of individuals to 
obtain protection under Ohio’s domestic violence statute based on their status would raise grave 
constitutional concerns and should be avoided.” Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, Inc., in Support of Appellee State of Ohio, supra note 26, at 5 
n.1. The relevant federal court citation offered is Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), though 
no explanation why is provided. Accord Merit Brief of Amici Curaie [sic] American Civil 
Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. and American Civil Liberties Union in Support of 
Appellee, State of Ohio at 6 n.1, State v. Carswell, No. 06-151 (Ohio July 17, 2006) (“Amici 
curiae ACLU of Ohio and ACLU do not take occasion here to address the constitutionality of 
the Marriage Amendment, as doing so is wholly unnecessary for addressing the issue at bar, and 
this court ‘should avoid addressing constitutional issues which need not necessarily be 
considered in reaching a decision on the case before it.’”) (quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 157 Ohio St. 182, 196 (1958))); but see 
Brief of the State of Ohio, supra note 8, at 32–33 (elaborating the equal protection problems if 
the Ohio Supreme Court should decide to read the Marriage Amendment to nullify existing 
domestic violence protections for unmarried individuals); Brief of Amici Curiae Action Ohio 
Coalition of Battered Women, Ohio Domestic Violence Network, and Ohio NOW Education 
and Legal Fund in Support of Appellee State of Ohio, supra note 26, at 22–29 (same). I have 
already sketched how I would run a cite to Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) in Marc 
Spindelman, Associate Professor, The Ohio State Univ. Moritz College of Law, Some Issues 
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For more than thirty years—at least since the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird,41 freshly reaffirmed 
and extended by Lawrence v. Texas42—it has been settled federal 
constitutional law that a state cannot legitimately draw distinctions 
 
with Issue 1, Presentation at Moritz College of Law Forum: The “Defense of Marriage” 
Amendment: What Is the Amendment Defending Now? (Apr. 19, 2006).  
 Nearly as troubling and unexplained as Lambda’s abandonment of any equal protection 
argument against the Marriage Amendment is its evident decision to forego any serious 
discussion of the realities of same-sex domestic violence, including its empirical dimensions, 
beyond some oblique, passing references to the phenomenon. See Memorandum of Amicus 
Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., in Support of Appellee State of Ohio, 
supra note 26, at 5 (“Nothing in the Ohio Constitution permits batterers to avoid appropriate 
punishment, or leaves unmarried partner victims, including gay and lesbian victims, without a 
remedy they long have had.”); id. at 14–15 n.4 (citing PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ181867, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE 39 (2000)). This decision, it should be said, nearly left its survivors’ 
interests all but completely unrepresented as such, and would have, but for the efforts of another 
brief, which attempted to cobble together a constitutional argument against the Marriage 
Amendment specifically in their name. Brief of Amici Curiae Action Ohio Coalition of 
Battered Women, Ohio Domestic Violence Network, and Ohio NOW Education and Legal 
Fund in Support of Appellee State of Ohio, supra note 26, at 29–34. Had Lambda wished to cite 
and discuss some of the relevant empirical evidence, it was at hand in TJADEN & THOENNES, 
supra, at 29–31. Though Lambda’s brief does not say, the elision of any engagement with the 
realities of same-sex domestic violence might have had something to do with the findings 
Tjaden and Thoennes reached: that, for instance,  
same-sex cohabitants reported significantly more intimate partner violence than did 
opposite-sex cohabitants. Among women, 39.2 percent of the same-sex cohabitants 
and 21.7 percent of the opposite-sex cohabitants reported being raped, physically 
assaulted, and/or stalked by a marital/cohabiting partner at some time in their lifetime. 
Among men, the comparable figures are 23.1 percent and 7.4 percent. 
Id. at 30. Hardly good news, viewed from a classically pro-gay political perspective, at least if 
one puts aside the methodological limitations and certain other wrinkles related to these 
findings, which Tjaden and Thoennes note, as well as how at odds they are with other studies, 
correctly described as “studies of small, unrepresentative samples of gay and lesbian couples” 
that “suggest that same-sex couples are about as violent as heterosexual couples.” Id. at 29; see 
also id. at 31 n.1 (collecting sources). But then, the Lambda brief does not bother to cite any of 
the leading Ohio cases on same-sex domestic violence, such as State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 
1191 (1991), State v. Yaden, 691 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (1997); or State v. Linner, 77 Ohio Misc. 
2d 22 (Hamilton County Mun. Ct. 1996) either, though, to be fair, it does cite cases that do cite 
one or more of them, if not apparently for that reason. See, e.g., Memorandum of Amicus 
Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., in Support of Appellee State of Ohio, 
supra note 26, at 10, 21 n.8 (citing State v. Nixon, 845 N.E.2d 544, 549 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)); 
id. at 1, 10, 21 n.8. This issue is reported on in Eric Resnick, Experts Disagree on How to 
Combat Ohio’s Ban Amendment, GAY PEOPLES’ CHRONICLE (Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 22, 2006, 
at 4. 
 41. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 42. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
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between married and unmarried couples, or married and unmarried 
individuals, for purposes of the criminal law—certainly not on 
traditional morality grounds.43 But there is no conceivable 
 
 43. References to the moral underpinnings of the Massachusetts statute at issue in 
Eisenstadt are laced throughout the opinion. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 442–43 (“In a 
subsequent decision . . . the [Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court], however, found ‘a second 
and more compelling ground for upholding the statute’—namely, to protect morals through 
‘regulating the private sexual lives of single persons.’ The Court of Appeals . . . did not 
consider the promotion of health or the protection of morals through the deterrence of 
fornication to be the legislative aim.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 443 (“We agree that the goals 
of deterring premarital sex and regulating the distribution of potentially harmful articles cannot 
reasonably be regarded as legislative aims of [the provisions at issue in the case].”); id. at 448 
(“[T]he Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court [has] explained that the law’s ‘plain purpose is 
to protect purity, to preserve chastity, to encourage continence and self restraint, to defend the 
sanctity of the home, and thus to engender in the State and nation a virile and virtuous race of 
men and women.’ Although the State clearly abandoned that purpose . . ., at least insofar as the 
illicit sexual activities of married persons are concerned, the court reiterated . . . that the object 
of legislation is to discourage premarital sexual intercourse. Conceding that the State could, 
consistent[] with the Equal Protection Clause, regard the problems of extramarital and 
premarital sexual relations as ‘[e]vils . . . of different dimensions and proportions, requiring 
different remedies,’ we cannot agree that the deterrence of premarital sex may reasonably be 
regarded as the purpose of the Massachusetts law. It would be plainly unreasonable to assume 
that Massachusetts has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment 
for fornication, which is a misdemeanor under Massachusetts [law]. Aside from the scheme of 
values that assumption would attribute to the State, it is abundantly clear that the effect of the 
ban on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons has at best a marginal relation to the 
proferred objective.” (citations and footnotes omitted)). But most significant for present 
purposes is this dimension of the Eisenstadt Court’s reasoning:  
 If the Massachusetts statue cannot be upheld as a deterrent to fornication or as a 
health measure, may it, nevertheless, be sustained simply as a prohibition on 
contraception? The Court of Appeals[’] analysis “led inevitably to the conclusion that, 
so far as morals are concerned, it is contraceptives per se that are considered 
immoral—to the extent that Griswold will permit such a declaration.” The Court of 
Appeals went on to hold: 
“To say that contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be forbidden to 
unmarried persons who will nevertheless persist in having intercourse, means 
that such persons must risk for themselves an unwanted pregnancy, for the 
child, illegitimacy, and for society, a possible obligation of support. Such a 
view of morality is not only the very mirror image of sensible legislation; we 
consider that it conflicts with fundamental human rights. In the absence of 
demonstrated harm, we hold it is beyond the competency of the state.”  
 We need not and do not, however, decide that important question in this case 
because, whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the 
rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike. 
 If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be 
prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital 
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relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart 
of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and 
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child. 
 . . . . 
  . . . We hold that by providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried 
persons who are similarly situated, Massachusetts [anti-contraception laws] violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
Id. at 452–55. Whatever one might wish to say about Eisenstadt’s apparent sympathy for the 
appellate court’s view that morality as such, independent of some non-traditional morality-
based notion of “harm,” is a constitutionally inadequate justification for state action, the Court 
avows that traditional morality alone cannot and does not provide an adequate constitutional 
basis for distinguishing between married and unmarried individuals who are otherwise similarly 
situated, as they are at least where criminal regulations of the sort at issue in Eisenstadt are 
concerned. Accord LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1423 (2d ed. 1988) 
(describing Eisenstadt as having “declared that just such a distinction between married and 
single persons was unconstitutional”). For some indication of how Lawrence affirms and 
extends this reasoning, see, for example, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) 
(reaffirming Eisenstadt and its rule that traditional morality alone does not provide an adequate 
basis for distinguishing the constitutional rights of married and unmarried individuals); id. at 
566 (same); id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Eisenstadt court “refused to 
sanction a law that discriminated between married and unmarried persons”); id. at 582 
(suggesting that Lawrence raises the question whether “moral disapproval is a legitimate state 
interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual 
sodomy,” and declaring flatly that “[i]t is not”); id. (“Indeed, we have never held that moral 
disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal 
Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons.”). For his part, 
Justice Scalia, in dissent, recognized the deep challenge that Justice O’Connor’s reasoning, 
hence, by implication, Eisenstadt’s, may pose to marriage, if it is understood strictly in 
traditional moral terms:  
This reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples. Justice O’Connor seeks to preserve them by the conclusory 
statement that “preserving the traditional institution of marriage” is a legitimate state 
interest. But “preserving the traditional institution of marriage” is just a kinder way of 
describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples. 
Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). An answer to this, of course, assuming it is right, is that the 
problem is not one that is simply of Justice O’Connor’s making, but is one that should be 
placed at Eisenstadt’s door—even if Justice O’Connor does not invoke Eisenstadt at precisely 
that moment in her Lawrence opinion when she embraces a fairly robust version of its principle. 
Cf. John Noonan, Jr., The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 255, 273 
(describing Eisenstadt, among other cases, as “wrong,” in part, because it “subvert[s] the 
privileged status of marriage, contrary to the teaching of Loving v. Virginia . . . [and] contrary 
to the place of marriage in American experience. To say that legal immunities and legal benefits 
may not depend on marriage is to deny the vital right. To say that Equal Protection requires the 
equal treatment of the married and the unmarried in all respects is to deny the hierarchy of 
values of our society.”). For other thoughts on the relation between Eisenstadt and Lawrence, 
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justification aside from traditional morality for the state not to 
recognize the existence of non-marital intimate relationships as such, 
including their violent realities, through the domestic violence law.44 
If the Marriage Amendment requires the state to differentiate 
between married and unmarried perpetrators (and victims) of 
domestic abuse, and if the only possible justification for this is 
traditional morality, standing alone, then the Marriage Amendment 
violates federal constitutional law.45 It is worth noting that the state’s 
lawyers have for some time recognized this; indeed, in Carswell, they 
openly conceded the point.46 
 
and of both to traditional morality, see, for example, Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. 
Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615 (2004) (reading Lawrence to have affirmed the sexual rights of 
heterosexuals, married and not, and the sexual rights of lesbians and gay men, by extension); 
see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After 
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004). 
 44. So far as I have been able to discern, nobody has advanced one. The brief filed for the 
State of Ohio has, in fact, conceded none exists:  
 In order to avoid constitutional difficulties, the State must have a rational basis to 
differentiate between those persons who are living together, share familial and 
financial responsibilities and consortium and are married, and those persons who are 
living together, share familial and financial responsibilities, and consortium and are 
not married. No such rational basis exists. While the state has a legitimate and 
uncontested interest in preserving and encouraging marriage, none of those interests 
are served through domestic violence laws, because their purpose is to provide 
enhanced penalties for violence in familial relationships.  
Brief of the State of Ohio, supra note 8, at 33. The same basic point was made by the state in 
State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas Cuyahoga County 
Mar. 23, 2005), one of the first decisions crediting a Marriage Amendment challenge to Ohio’s 
domestic violence law. Id. at *7 (quoting the state’s argument that the Marriage Amendment, if 
interpreted to eliminate domestic violence protections for unmarried victims, “would arbitrarily 
discriminate against a class of persons based on marital status and immediately deny them the 
protections afforded by Ohio’s domestic violence law. There can be no rational relationship to a 
legitimate government interest if [the Marriage Amendment] is construed to strip the 
protections of the domestic violence law from unmarried persons. Such an arbitrary and 
discriminatory outcome would therefore violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal 
Constitution.”).  
 45. This argument is made in Brief of Amici Curiae Action Ohio Coalition of Battered 
Women, Ohio Domestic Violence Network, and Ohio NOW Education and Legal Fund in 
Support of Appellee State of Ohio, supra note 26, at 22–29. Cf. State v. Linner, 77 Ohio Misc. 
2d 22, 25 (Hamilton County Mun. Ct. 1996) (“[T]he court is reminded that ‘it . . . is not an 
ecclesiastical tribunal [empowered] to enforce moral standards uncodified by statute.’” 
(alteration in original) (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 465 N.E.2d 476, 477 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983))). 
 46. See supra note 44. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/8
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Still, remarkably, of the dozens of trial and appellate court judges 
in Ohio who have heard and decided cases involving a Marriage 
Amendment attack on the domestic violence law,47 only Judge James 
Celebrezze seems to have fully understood and accepted this line of 
reasoning.48 As he concluded in Phelps v. Johnson,49 it is irrational 
and unreasonable, hence unconstitutional, for the state to distinguish 
between or among cases of domestic violence based on the marital 
status of the perpetrator and the victim. As he wrote: 
[T]he differentiation between the protections provide[d] 
married victims of domestic violence, vis-à-vis unmarried 
victims, bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state 
interest, and the classifications drawn [along those lines in the 
Marriage Amendment] are not reasonable in light of its 
purpose.50 
 
 47. See Appendix. 
 48. The Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District in Green County, Ohio, in its 
decision in State v. Ward, 849 N.E.2d 1076 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), striking down domestic 
violence protections for unmarried victims on Marriage Amendment grounds, did seem to 
signal, as one judge on that court has pointed out to me, that it was aware of the federal 
constitutional issues (potentially) implicated by the Marriage Amendment’s challenge to the 
state’s domestic violence law. As the Ward court explained:  
Some of the[] amicus briefs raise issues that have not been raised by the parties, either 
in the trial court or this court—e.g., that the Defense of Marriage amendment violates 
the Supremacy and Equal Protection [C]lauses of the United States Constitution. 
Because these issues were not raised in the trial court, we deem them waived, and do 
not reach them. 
Id. at 1078. This might have been a nice recognition of the point I am making, as well as an 
appropriate reservation of it for some future case, except the Ward court took it upon itself 
selectively to consider arguments from briefs not actually before it in that case. Id. Having 
taken that unusual step, I fail to see why the court did not and could not have considered the 
equal protection arguments it deemed “waived,” especially since, if those arguments are correct 
as a matter of law, as the State of Ohio has recognized, see supra note 44, the Ward court’s 
interpretation of the Marriage Amendment—that it nullifies existing domestic violence 
protections for unmarried victims of abuse—puts it out of constitutional bounds, hence makes 
Ward itself an unconstitutional decision. My sense, accordingly, is that the court believed that 
the equal protection arguments were actually without merit. I have a different reaction to Burk, 
2005 WL 786212, at *7, however, though it suffers a similar flaw. 
 49. Phelps v. Johnson, No. DV05 305642, 2005 WL 4651081 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 
Cuyahoga County Nov. 28, 2005). 
 50. Id. at *2; accord Brief of Amici Curiae Action Ohio Coalition of Battered Women, 
Ohio Domestic Violence Network, and Ohio NOW Education and Legal Fund in Support of 
Appellee State of Ohio, supra note 26, at 7 & n.9. 
Washington University Open Scholarship










184 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 24:165 
 
 
To be sure, Judge Celebrezze did not cite either Eisenstadt or 
Lawrence as authority for his reasoning or its upshot: that the 
Marriage Amendment violates the United States Constitution.51 But 
he internalized and recapitulated their shared constitutional point. 
At least in this respect, Judge Celebrezze got it right in Phelps, 
and the Ohio Supreme Court should follow his lead when it rules in 
Carswell. Whether it does or not, though, it is sure to teach cultural 
conservatives a lesson the anti-domestic-violence movement has been 
insisting on, for years: There is a price to pay for the moral hubris it 
takes to treat victims and survivors of abuse as pawns in your own 
game. 
 
 51. The cases Judge Celebrezze did cite, are: Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 25, 32 (1954), 
and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). Phelps, 2005 WL 4651081, at *2. Some 
light on what he may have had in mind when doing so can be found in Brief of Amici Curiae 
Action Ohio Coalition of Battered Women, Ohio Domestic Violence Network, and Ohio NOW 
Education and Legal Fund in Support of Appellee State of Ohio, supra note 26, at 40. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/8














Trial Court Cases 
Upholding Domestic Violence Statute 







Date Court Page/ 
Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 










p. 5 “[T]his Court holds that Clark has not 
met the burden of proof incumbent upon 
him to demonstrate that the amendment 
to Article XV, Section 11 as the Ohio 
Constitution rendered O.R.C. 3113.31 
facially unconstitutional or, as in the 
matter at bar, unconstitutional as 
applied.” 
 










pp. 7-8 “R.C. §2919.25 does not represent a 
recognition or creation of a legal status 
for unmarried individuals that intends to 
approximate the design, qualities, 
significance or effect of marriage. . . .
This court demonstrated a reasonable 
interpretation of the Domestic Violence 
Statute that allows both the statute and 
Article XV Section 11 to coexist.
Therefore, Defendant’s motion is 
denied.” 
 









p. 4 “R.C. 2919.25 and Oh. Const. Art. XV, 
§11 are able to coexist without 
Constitutional violation. To hold 
otherwise would result in eliminating a 
majority of the domestic protections 
afforded by the General Assembly and
leave thousands of Ohio citizens subject 
to violence within their households 
without any significant criminal legal 
recourse.” 
 










p. 11 “Art. XV, §11 of the Ohio Constitution
was not enacted to strip intimate 
cohabitants from the protection of Ohio’s 
domestic violence laws. Therefore, the 
domestic violence statute is not 
unconstitutional under Art. XV, §11 of 
the Ohio Constitution.” See also 
Supplemental Order, State v. McIntosh, 
2004 CR 4712, at 1-2 (Ohio Ct. 
Common Pleas Montgomery County 
May 2, 2005). 
 
 
 † This Appendix does not conform to THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM MANUAL OF 
CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).  
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Trial Court Cases 
Upholding Domestic Violence Statute 







Date Court Page/ 
Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 








p. 2 “Defendant’s motion to dismiss based 
upon the unconstitutionality of the 
[domestic violence] statute in light of the 
recently enacted marriage validity 
amendment to the Ohio Constitution is, 
therefore, DENIED.” 
 










p. 11 “Art. XV, §11 of the Ohio Constitution 
was not enacted to strip intimate 
cohabitants from the protection of Ohio’s 
domestic violence laws. Therefore, the 
domestic violence statute is not 
unconstitutional under Art. XV, §11 of 
the Ohio Constitution.” 
 










p. 10 “Art. XV, §11 of the Ohio Constitution 
was not enacted to strip intimate 
cohabitants from the protection of Ohio’s 
domestic violence laws. Therefore, the 
domestic violence statute is not 
unconstitutional under Art. XV, §11 of 
the Ohio Constitution.” 
 










p. 11 “Art. XV, §11 of the Ohio Constitution 
was not enacted to strip intimate 
cohabitants from the protection of Ohio’s 
domestic violence laws. Therefore, the 
domestic violence statute is not 
unconstitutional under Art. XV, §11 of 
the Ohio Constitution.” 
 








p. 2 “Defendant’s motion to dismiss based 
upon unconstitutionality of the statute in 
light of the recently enacted marriage 
validity amendment to the Ohio 
Constitution is, therefore, DENIED.” 
 











p. 1 “Motion to dismiss pursuant to State 
Issue One argument denied by the 
Court.” 










pp. 2-3 “[T]his Court adopts the rationale in 
State of Ohio v. David McIntosh (April 
18, 2005) Montgomery County Common 
Pleas Court, Case No. 2004-CR-4712, in 
toto, in finding that Sections 2919.25, 
2919.27 and 3113.31, are not 
unconstitutional under Article XV, 
Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution.”
(emphasis removed) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/8










2007]  The Whipsaws of Backlash 187 
 
 
Trial Court Cases 
Upholding Domestic Violence Statute 







Date Court Page/ 
Paragraph
 # 











p. 11 “The statute at issue is designed to 
protection [sic] against violence that 
arises from the intimacy of a shared 
household and/or consortium. That 
violence and that protection are not 
dependent upon marital status. The 
Magistrate therefore RECOMMENDS
that the respondent’s motion to dismiss 
be denied . . . .” (emphasis removed). 
 
3 State v. 
McKinley 







p. 3 “[T]his Court believes that the 
amendment only effects laws adopted on 
or after December 1, 2004, and not those 
already in existence. For the above 
reasons, the Court finds the motion to 
dismiss the indictment is NOT WELL 
TAKEN. It is ORDERED that the 
motion to dismiss the indictment be, and 
hereby is[,] DENIED.” (emphasis 
removed). 
 









p. 1 “Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is 
OVERRULED. . . .The Court, being 
fully aware of State v. Humbarger, 2002-
Ohio-4160, a 3rd district case out of Van 
Wert County, opinion by Judge Hadley, 
is of the belief that with the state of the 
law since the rendering of that opinion 
having changed, the opinion (and 
consequently the stance of the Third 
Appellate District) would today affirm 
the trial court.” 
 









p. 9 “After thorough review, the court finds 
no evidence that there was any intent on 
the part of the Legislature, in creating the 
definitions, ‘living as a spouse,’ 
‘cohabited’ and ‘otherwise cohabiting,’ 
to bestow upon unmarried individuals, or 
to recognize in them, a legal status that 
approximates the design, qualities, 
significance or effect of marriage. . . . 
[T]he court finds that the Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss is not well-taken. It 
is, therefore, DENIED.” 
 










p. 2 “This Court finds that the purpose behind 
Article XV, Section 11 of the Ohio 
constitution [sic] does not pass the 
‘rational basis test’. [sic] Therefore, the 
second sentence of Article XV, Section
11 of the Ohio Constitution (Issue 1) is 
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Upholding Domestic Violence Statute 







Date Court Page/ 
Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 
in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
(Equal Protections Clause) as it pertains 
to the Domestic Violence Act in Ohio 
law.” See also text accompanying notes 
47-51, supra.  
 
10 State v. 
Rodgers 






p. 9 “[T]he Marriage Amendment did not 
override R.C. 2919.25 by implication, as 
when the Marriage Amendment and the 
statute are both given a reasonable 
construction they can both coexist. The 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is 
DENIED.” (emphasis removed). 
 








p. 4 “The Defense of Marriage Amendment 
does not nor should it be applicable to 
criminal statutes in general or the 
Domestic Violence Statute in particular.”
  








p. 4 “The Defense of Marriage Amendment 
does not nor should it be applicable to 
criminal statutes in general or the 
Domestic Violence Statute in particular.”
 








p. 4 “The Defense of Marriage Amendment 
does not nor should it be applicable to 
criminal statutes in general or the 
Domestic Violence Statute in particular.”
 








p. 4 “The Defense of Marriage Amendment 
does not nor should it be applicable to 
criminal statutes in general or the 
Domestic Violence Statute in particular.”
 
 
Trial Court Cases 
Upholding Domestic Violence Statute 
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Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 










¶ 9 Appellate Decision, 2006 Ohio 5600: “In 
his second assignment of error, Ramirez 


















Trial Court Cases 
Upholding Domestic Violence Statute 







Date Court Page/ 
Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 









¶ 8 Appellate Decision, 2006 Ohio 1127: 
“Defendant did not challenge the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2919.25(A) by 
way of a Crim.R. 12(C)(1) motion filed 
in the trial court or in any other way prior 
to this appeal.” 
 









¶ 6 Appellate Decision, 2006 Ohio 2938: 
“[T]he trial court denied Logsdon’s 
motion to dismiss the charge of domestic 
violence on the unconstitutionality of the 
R.C. 2919.25(A), based upon the 
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 
decision in State v. Rodgers, 131 Ohio 
Misc. 2d 1 . . . .” 
 









¶ 5 Appellate Decision, 2005 Ohio 6333: 
“Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to 
dismiss arguing that Issue 1 rendered the 
domestic violence statute, R.C. 2919.25, 
unconstitutional. This matter proceeded 
to a bench trial on February 22, 2005.
Prior to the commencement of trial, the 
court denied appellant’s motion to 
dismiss.” 
 
5 City of 
Ulrichsville 
v. Losey* 








¶ 29 Appellate Decision, 2005 Ohio 6564: “In 
his Third Assignment of Error, appellant 
maintains trial court erred in convicting 
him of domestic violence against Tonya, 
to whom he has never been married, 
following the Defense of Marriage 
Amendment to the Ohio Constitution.” 
 










¶ 63 Appellate Decision, 2006 Ohio 3926: 
“Appellant, in his first assignment of 
error, argues that the trial court erred in 
overruling his Crim.R. 29 motion of 
acquittal with respect to the domestic 
violence charge because R.C. 2919.25, 
the domestic-violence statute, violates 
the Defense of Marriage Amendment of 
the Ohio Constitution, and is therefore 
unconstitutional.” 
 









¶ 9 Appellate Decision, 2005 Ohio 7064: 
“Appellant, in his sole assignment of 
error, contends that the trial court erred 
in finding Appellant guilty of domestic 
violence in violation of R.C. §2919.25 
arguing that the recent amendment to the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 
Ohio Constitution by this State’s voters 
prohibits the spousal protection of 
unmarried couples.” 









¶ 26 Appellate Decision, 2005 Ohio 2848: 
“Appellant, in his second assignment of 
error, contends that the trial court 
committed plain error in allowing 
appellant to be tried and convicted of 
domestic violence in violation of R.C. 
2919.25 when ‘recent changes to the 
Ohio Constitution by this State’s voters 
prohibit the spousal protection of 
unmarried couples.’” 










¶ 44 Appellate Decision, 2006 Ohio 6267: “In 
her fourth assignment of error, appellant 
challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence as it relates to the domestic 
violence charge. In particular, appellant 
argues that the domestic violence statute, 
contained in R.C. 2919.25, violates the 
State’s Constitution because it grants a 
legal status to unmarried persons living 
as spouses.” See also ¶ 3 (noting motion 
for acquittal on “all three counts” was 
denied). 
 
Trial Court Cases  
Striking Down Domestic Violence Statute 







Date Court Page/ 
Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 









p. 4 “[T]he Court further agrees with the 
reasoning and views of Judge Friedman 
of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas 
Court and finds those reasons most 
persuasive and based upon the plain 
language of Section 2919.25 of the Ohio 
Revised Code and the plain language of 
Article XV, Section 11, the Marriage 
Validity amendment, the Court finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
portion of Section 2929.25 as relates to a 
family or household member being 
defined as a person living as a spouse, is 
unconstitutional . . . .” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/8
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p. 7 “[T]he Ohio Domestic Violence Statute 
is incompatible and in conflict with the 
Ohio Constitution insofar as it 
recognizes a person living as a spouse as 
a family or household member, when 
they are unmarried individuals.” 
 









p. 7 “[T]he Ohio Domestic Violence Statute 
is incompatible and in conflict with the 
Ohio Constitution insofar as it 
recognizes a person living as a spouse as 
a family or household member, when 
they are unmarried individuals.” 
 









p. 1 “[B]ased upon the Court’s previous 
holding [in State v. Peterson, supra] that 
the statute is unconstitutional as relates 
to these facts, the indictment herein is 
dismissed.” 
 









p. 1 “[B]ased upon the Court’s previous 
holding that the statute is 
unconstitutional as [it] relates to 
unmarried persons living as a spouse, the 
indictment herein is dismissed.” 
 









p. 1 “Upon motion of counsel, and for good 
cause shown, the within matter is hereby 
dismissed.” 
 









p. 1 “Based upon this Court’s decisions in 
State vs. Jason Dixon Case No: 2005 CR 
91, Greene County Common Pleas 
Court, and State vs. Steinman Case No: 
2005 CR 68, Greene County Common 
Pleas Court, this Court finds the 
Defendant’s Motion well taken and is 
GRANTED.” 
 









p. 1 “Based upon this Court’s decisions in 
State vs. Jason Dixon Case No: 2005 CR
91, Greene County Common Pleas 
Court, and State vs. Steinman Case No: 
2005 CR 68, Greene County Common 
Pleas Court, this Court finds the 
Defendant’s Motion well taken and is 
GRANTED.” 
 
2 State v.  
D. Ward 





p. 1 “[S]ince the Defendant and the victim 
are not married, both the domestic 
violence charge and the Civil Protection
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Striking Down Domestic Violence Statute 







Date Court Page/ 
Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 
Order against the Defendant are hereby 
DISMISSED.” 








pp. 2-3 “It seems clear to this court that the 
domestic violence statute was crafted to 
protect unmarried individuals in a 
relationship that approximates the 
design, qualities, significance or effect of 
marriage. The new amendment now 
prohibits the court from recognizing such 
a relationship. Consequently, since the 
state has stipulated that the evidence in 
this case will be that the defendant and 
the victim were living together in a 
nonmarital relationship, the state is 
unable to prove domestic violence and 
the charge against Tiffany Renner is 
dismissed.” 








pp. 2-3 “It seems clear to this court that the 
domestic violence statute was crafted to 
protect unmarried individuals in a 
relationship that approximates the 
design, qualities, significance or effect of 
marriage. The amendment now prohibits 
the court from recognizing such a 
relationship. Consequently, since the 
state has stipulated that the evidence in 
this case will be that the defendant and
the victim were living together in a 
nonmarital relationship, the state is 
unable to prove domestic violence and 
the charge against Richard Goshorn is 
dismissed.”  










p. 2 “O.R.C. 3113.31(A)(4) is 
unconstitutional under Article XV, 
Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution as 
applied to unmarried individuals who are 
cohabiting with no children in common.”
7 State v. 
Rexroad 






p. 5 “This Court finds that R.C. §2919.25 (A) 
is unconstitutional as it applies to an 
unmarried man and woman living 
together as spouses.” 
7 State v. 
McCaslin 






p. 1 “For the reasons set forth in this Court’s 
decision in State v. Rexroad, 2005 CR 
79, a copy of which is attached to this 
judgment entry and incorporated in this 
entry[,] the motion to dismiss is 
granted.” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol24/iss1/8
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Striking Down Domestic Violence Statute 
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Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 
7 State v. 
Pasco 






p. 3 “If as alleged by the State the parties 
were living together as husband and wife 
then the statue is unconstitutional as it 
applies to this defendant[.] . . . If as 
alleged by the defendant the parties were 
not romantically involved then under 
State v. Williams the State cannot 
prosecute the defendant because only 
those persons cohabitating can bring 
domestic violence charges. Therefore the 
indictment is subject to dismissal on 
either of these grounds.”  









p. 14 “[T]he adoption of the Amendment 
makes charging unmarried cohabitants 
with domestic violence a legal 
impossibility. It is no incumbent upon 
the General Assembly to correct the 
infirmities of the domestic violence 
statute or to toughen the Assault statute 
so victims are afforded more protection.”










p. 11 “[T]he Court finds, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that Ohio R.C. §2919.25 is 
incompatible with Art. XV, §11, of the 
Ohio Constitution, insofar as it 
recognizes as a ‘family or household 
member’ a person who is not married to 
the offender but is ‘living as a spouse.’” 










p. 1 “Defendant’s motion to dismiss is 
granted in part. Indictments amended to 
assault, R.C. 2903.13, on authority of 
this Court’s opinion in State v. Burk, 
Case No. 462510 [finding the domestic 
violence statute unconstitutional].” 










p. 1 “Per court’s decision in State v. Bu[r]k 
(CR 462510), court dismisses original 
charge of domestic violence and finds 
that L.I.O is appropriate per criminal rule 
7(D). Case to proceed on amended 
charge of assault, R.C. 2903.13.” 









p. 3 “This Court must, too, reach the 
conclusion that an unintended effect of 
the recent amendment is to make R.C. 
2919.25 unconstitutional as it pertains to 
allegations where the offender and the 
victim are living as a spouse, but are not 
married.” 
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p. 2 “[T]he Court finds R.C. §2919.25 is 
unconstitutional when applied to a 
defendant whose only relationship to the 
victim is as a ‘person living as a 
spouse.’” 
 
Trial Court Cases  
Striking Down Domestic Violence Statute 







Date Court Page/ 
Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 










¶ 1 Appellate Decision, 862 N.E.2d 171: 
“The court found that in light of the Ohio 
Constitution’s new Article XV, Section 
11 (known as ‘Issue 1’), the state could 
not pursue a conviction against Kvasne 
for the offense of domestic violence.” 
 
Trial Court Cases 
Constitutionality of Domestic Violence Statute Not Raised 







Date Court Page/ 
Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 









¶ 8 Appellate Decision, 2006 Ohio 5995: 
“Appellant claims his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2919.25….” 









¶ 7 Appellate Decision, 2006 Ohio 3378: 
“Appellant neither filed a motion to 
dismiss supported by these arguments, 
nor did he raise these arguments below 
during any proceedings.” 










¶ 13 Appellate Decision, 2006 Ohio 6281: “In 
his second assignment of error, Williams 
argues that he was denied his 
constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel because his counsel 
failed to move for a dismissal of the 
indictment based on the 
unconstitutionality of the domestic 
violence statute.” (Defendant pled guilty.)
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Date Court Page/ 
Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 









¶ 10 Appellate Decision, 2005 Ohio 6855: 
“Appellant also argues that his counsel 
should have informed him that Section 
11, Article XV of the Ohio Constitution, 
Ohio’s ‘Defense of Marriage’
amendment, might render the domestic 
violence statute unconstitutional as 
applied to him.” (Defendant pled guilty). 
 
Trial Court Cases 
Constitutionality of Domestic Violence Statute Raised But Not Addressed 







Date Court Page/ 
Paragraph
 # 
Holding/Authority for Holding 










pp. 2-3 “The State concludes that deciding the 
Defendant’s constitutionality challenge is 
unnecessary, because the ‘parental 
relationship’ statutory alternative is not in 
conflict with Article XV, section 11 of the 
Ohio Constitution. . . . This Court 
therefore need not address the Defendant’s 
constitutional challenge[.]” 










p. 5 “Thus, Art. XV, §11 did not take effect 
until December 2, 2004, thirty days after 
being approved by the voters at the general 
election….The text of Issue 1 did not 
clearly provide for retrospective 
application; therefore, it took effect on 
December 2, 2004, and any charge of 
domestic violence that arose prior to that 
date must be governed by the legal 
relationship of the defendant and the 
alleged victim existing as of the date of the 
alleged offense.” 
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Ohio App. 1 
Dist. 
¶ 13 “We agree with those cases that have held 
that the domestic-violence statute does not 
create a legal status that approximates the 
design, qualities, significance, or effect of 
marriage. Therefore, we join those districts 
that have held that R.C. 2919.25 does not 
violate the Defense of Marriage 
Amendment.” 






Ohio App. 4 
Dist. 
¶ 7 “We agree with the rationales expressed in 
Burk, Newell, Carswell, Rexroad, and 
Nixon that R.C. 2919.25 does not create or 
recognize a legal status approximating 
marriage. Instead, it defines a criminal 
offense and defines the class of persons 
entitled to protection. Because R.C. 
2919.25 is predicated upon the factual 
determination of cohabitation, not the legal 
determination of marriage, both the statute 
and Article XV[,] Section II of the Ohio 
Constitution may coexist.” 






Ohio App. 5 
Dist. 
¶¶ 45-46 “‘[H]ad the proponents intended to alter 
Ohio’s domestic-violence law, they would 
have drafted the Marriage Amendment 
accordingly. It was readily apparent by 
2004 that Ohio’s domestic-violence law 
referred to, but did[] not create, a legal 
status that approximates marriage.’ Based 
on the foregoing, we find that appellant’s 
conviction for domestic violence was not 
unconstitutional.” (citation omitted). 






Ohio App. 5 
Dist. 
¶¶ 26-27 “‘Therefore, had the proponents intended 
to alter Ohio’s domestic-violence law, they 
would have drafted the Marriage 
Amendment accordingly.’ Therefore, for 
the foregoing reasons, we find appellant’s 
conviction, for domestic violence, was not 
unconstitutional.” (citation omitted). 







Ohio App. 5 
Dist. 
¶ 32 “This Court rejected an argument 
analogous to appellant’s present 
contention in State v. Newell, Stark 
App.No. 2004CA00264, 2005 Ohio 2848, 
¶ 43-¶ 46. Appellant herein fails to 
persuade us [to] alter our holding in 
Newell. Accordingly, appellant’s Third 
Assignment of Error is overruled.” 
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Ohio App. 5 
Dist. 
¶¶ 28-29 “‘Therefore, had the proponents intended 
to alter Ohio’s domestic-violence law, they 
would have drafted the Marriage 
Amendment accordingly. It was readily 
apparent by 2004 that Ohio’s domestic-
violence law referred to, but did [] not 
create, a legal status that approximates 
marriage.’ Based on the foregoing, we find 
that appellant’s conviction for domestic 
violence was not unconstitutional.”
(citation omitted) 






Ohio App. 5 
Dist. 
¶ 21 “‘We agree with appellee that the Defense 
of Marriage Amendment has no 
application to criminal statutes in general 
or the domestic violence statute in 
particular.’” (citation omitted). 






Ohio App. 5 
Dist. 
¶¶ 79-80 “We agree with appellee that the Defense 
of Marriage Amendment has no 
application to criminal statutes in general 
or the domestic violence statute in 
particular.’ Based on the foregoing, we 
find that the trial court did not err in 
overruling appellant’s Crim. R. 29 motion 
for judgment of acquittal with respect to 
the domestic violence charge.” (citations 
omitted) 






Ohio App. 5 
Dist. 
¶¶ 14-15 “We have rejected a challenge to R.C. 
2919.25 via the DOMA in State v. Newell, 
Stark App.2004CA00264, 2005 Ohio 2848
. . . .: ‘We concur with appellee that the 
intent of the Defense of Marriage 
Amendment was to prohibit same sex 
marriage.* * *We agree with appellee that 
the Defense of Marriage Amendment has 
no application to criminal statutes in 
general or the domestic violence statute in 
particular. As noted by appellee, 
“[c]riminal statutes do not create rights; 
they prohibited (sic) certain conduct, it 
[2919.25] does not define marriage.”’” 
(alteration in original).  






Ohio App. 6 
Dist. 
¶ 34 “The domestic violence statute’s 
imposition of legal rights and liabilities 
neither intends to ‘approximate marriage’
nor does that legal status approximate 
marriage in fact.” 








Ohio App. 7 
Dist. 
¶ 35 “In these appeals, Rexroad and Pasco 
argue that they cannot be convicted under 
R.C. 2919.25(A) because that statute is
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 unconstitutional as it applies to them. 
However, there is no evidence 
demonstrating the particular facts of either 
case in the record at this stage of the 
proceedings, so we cannot determine 
whether the statute is unconstitutional as it 
applies to a particular set of facts. 
Accordingly, Appellees can only make a 
facial constitutional challenge to the 
statute. R.C. 2919.25(A) survives a facial 
challenge since there are many factual 
situations to which this statute could be 
constitutionally applied. Thus, the trial 
court’s judgments dismissing the 
indictments are reversed and these cases 
are remanded for further proceedings. 
Appellees are free to raise the 
constitutionality of the statute as applied to 
them at a later stage in their respective 
proceedings.” 






Ohio App. 7 
Dist. 
¶ 35 “In these appeals, Rexroad and Pasco 
argue that they cannot be convicted under 
R.C. 2919.25(A) because that statute is 
unconstitutional as it applies to them. 
However, there is no evidence 
demonstrating the particular facts of either 
case in the record at this stage of the 
proceedings, so we cannot determine 
whether the statute is unconstitutional as it 
applies to a particular set of facts. 
Accordingly, Appellees can only make a 
facial constitutional challenge to the 
statute. R.C. 2919.25(A) survives a facial 
challenge since there are many factual 
situations to which this statute could be 
constitutionally applied. Thus, the trial 
court’s judgments dismissing the 
indictments are reversed and these cases 
are remanded for further proceedings. 
Appellees are free to raise the 
constitutionality of the statute as applied to 








Ohio App. 7 
Dist. 
¶ 21 “In the instant case, as in Rexroad, there 
are no facts to evaluate, and therefore, no 
basis for the trial court to determine 
whether the statute was unconstitutional as 
applied. The record only contains 
allegations and assumptions. Thus, this 
Court’s recent holding in Rexroad applies 
equally to the instant case: ‘Before we can
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affirm a decision dismissing their 
indictment because the statute is being 
unconstitutionally applied, the record must 
contain evidence of the particular facts 
which cause the unconstitutional 
application of that statute. Thus, the trial 
court erred when it dismissed Appellees’ 
indictments for this reason.’”  






Ohio App. 7 
Dist. 
¶ 26 “In the eyes of the law, marriage is a 
special status which confers many rights 
and benefits upon the parties to a marriage. 
R.C. 3113.31 gives unmarried couples the 
ability to receive a DVCPO. This legal 
status falls far short of the legal status 
accorded to marriage. Thus, R.C. 3113.31 
does not violate the plain language of 
Article XV, Section 11 because the legal 
status it creates does not approximate the 
design, qualities, significance, or effect of 
marriage.” 







Ohio App. 8 
Dist. 
¶ 32 “We hold that Ohio’s domestic violence 
statute, insofar as it defines ‘family or 
household member’ to include unmarried 
individuals who live as spouses, is 
constitutional and coexists in harmony 
with Issue 1.” 






Ohio App. 8 
Dist. 
¶ 1 “For the reasons explained in this court’s 
opinion in State v. Burk, Cuyahoga App. 
No. 86162, 2005-Ohio-6727, we hold that 
Ohio’s domestic violence statute is 
constitutional and coexists in harmony 
with Article XV, Section 11 of the Ohio 
Constitution.” 






Ohio App. 8 
Dist. 
¶ 6 “Thus, for the reasons explained in this 
court’s opinion in Burk, we hold that 
Ohio’s domestic violence statute is 
constitutional and coexists in harmony 
with Section 11, Article XV, of the Ohio 
Constitution.” 






Ohio App. 8 
Dist. 
¶¶ 9-10 “The record in the case at bar reflects that 
the trial court found the domestic violence 
statute unconstitutional and amended the 
indictment to assault based on a finding 
that Wain was neither married nor had a 
child with the victim. Based on our 
holding in Burk, this case is reversed and 
remanded to the trial court. The trial 
court’s decision granting Wain’s motion to 
dismiss is reversed, Wain’s original
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indictment for domestic violence is 
reinstated, and this case is remanded.” 







Ohio App. 8 
Dist. 
¶ 5 “This court previously has held that R.C. 
2919.25 is neither incompatible with Issue 
1 nor unconstitutional in light of it.
Consequently, that portion of the trial 
court’s order is reversed, and [the cause] is 
remanded for further proceedings . . . .” 
(citations omitted). See also ¶¶ 24-25. 






Ohio App. 8 
Dist. 
¶ 47 “In State v. Burk, 164 Ohio App.3d 740, 
2005 Ohio 6727, 843 N.E.2d 1254, this 
court found that Ohio’s domestic violence 
statute is neither incompatible with, nor 
unconstitutional in light of, Issue 1 . . . The 
issue is presently pending in the Supreme 
Court of Ohio, and unless and until this 
court is reversed by the Supreme Court, 
we follow our precedent.” (citations 
omitted). 







Ohio App. 9 
Dist. 
¶ 16 “[W]e find that Nixon failed to meet his 
burden of establishing 
unconstitutionality.” 






Ohio App. 10 
Dist. 
¶ 18 “The Ohio domestic-violence statute does 
not conflict with Section 11, Article XV, 
Ohio Constitution.”  






Ohio App. 11 
Dist. 
¶ 33 “In our view, ‘living as a spouse’ under 
R.C. 2919.25, while nominally involving a 
relationship which might be factually 
comparable to marriage, was not enacted 
with an intent to approximate a de jure 
marriage nor does the legal status it affords 
approximate marriage in fact.” 






Ohio App. 12 
Dist. 
¶ 21 “We conclude that appellee cannot 
overcome the presumption of 
constitutionality accorded R.C. 2919.25. 
R.C. 2919.25 and Section 11, Article XV 
are reconcilable. Under a fair 
interpretation, R.C. 2919.25 does not 
create or recognize a legal status for 
relationships of unmarried individuals that 
intends to approximate the design, 
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Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 36 “We conclude that the ‘person living as a 
spouse’ provision of the domestic-violence 
statute, R.C. 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i), does 
violate the Defense of Marriage 
Amendment.” 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶¶ 2-3 “We recently held that R.C. 2919.25 is 
unconstitutional as it relates to cohabiting 
partners pursuant to the Marriage 
Amendment, Article XV, Sec. 11 of the 
Ohio Constitution. The appellant’s 
assignment of error is Overruled.” (citation 
omitted). 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 2 “We have recently agreed with Phillips’
contention in State v. Karen Ward, Greene 
App. No. 05-CA-75. The appellant’s 
assignment of error is sustained. Nothing 
precludes the State from charging Phillips 
with assault pursuant to R.C. 2903.13(A).”






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 3 “The State’s assignment of error is 
overruled upon the authority of State v. 
Ward  . . . . Based upon our reasoning in 
that opinion, we agree with the trial court’s 
conclusion that the extension, in R.C. 
2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i), of the protections of 
the Domestic Violence statute, to ‘a person 
living as a spouse’ violates the Defense of 
Marriage amendment to the Ohio 
Constitution, Article XV, Section 11.”
(citation omitted). 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 5 “For the reasons set forth in State v. Ward
(March 24, 2006), Greene App. No. 2005-
CA-75 . . . , we agree with Maddox that 
the extension of the provisions of the 
Domestic Violence statute to ‘a person 
living as a spouse’ does violate the 
Defense of Marriage amendment. The 
State does not dispute Maddox’s 
contention that he is being prosecuted for 
Domestic Violence upon the theory that 
his alleged victim, Rose Kelly, to whom 
he is not married, is a person living as a 
spouse. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
trial court erred when it denied Maddox’s 
motion to dismiss.” 
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Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 2 “We recently held that R.C. 2919.25(A) 
violates the Marriage Amendment, Article 
XV, Section 11, to the extent the statute 
provides that a ‘person living as a spouse’
includes one ‘who is otherwise cohabiting 
with the offender.’ Accordingly, the 
assignment of error is sustained. Since 
McIntosh’s charge of violating a civil 
protection order was by committing the 
crime of domestic violence, that 
conviction must be set aside as well. 
Nothing precludes the State from filing 
assault charges against McIntosh and a 
charge of violating the civil protection 
order by committing the crime of assault 
upon the victim.” (citation omitted) 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 4 “For the reasons set forth in State v. Ward, 
. . . . we agree with the trial court that the 
extension of the protections of the 
Domestic Violence statute, R.C. 
2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i), to ‘a person living as a 
spouse’ violates the Defense of Marriage 
amendment to the Ohio Constitution, 
Article XV, Section 11.” (citation 
omitted). 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 3 “The State’s assignment of error is 
overruled upon the authority of State v. 
Ward . . . . Based upon our reasoning in 
that opinion, we agree with the trial court’s 
conclusion that the extension, in R.C. 
2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i), of the protections of 
the Domestic Violence statute, to ‘a person 
living as a spouse’ violates the Defense of 
Marriage amendment to the Ohio 
Constitution, Article XV, Section 11.”
(citation omitted). 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 1 “Defendant-Appellant, Benny W. 
Bledsoe’s conviction and sentence for the 
offense of domestic violence, R.C. 
2919.25, is reversed and vacated on the 
authority of this court’s judgment in State 
v. Ward . . . .” (citation omitted). 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 6 “This court has recently determined that, 
to the extent that R.C. 2919.25 extended 
its protection to ‘a person living as a 
spouse,’ it was rendered unconstitutional 
by the Defense of Marriage amendment, 
which became effective on December 2, 
2004. For the reasons set forth in Ward,
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the state’s argument is without merit.”
(citation omitted). 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 6 “This court has recently determined that, 
to the extent that R.C. 2919.25 extended 
its protection to ‘a person living as a 
spouse,’ it was rendered unconstitutional 
by the Defense of Marriage amendment, 
which became effective on December 2, 
2004. For the reasons set forth in Ward, 
the state’s argument is without merit.”
(citation omitted). 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 6 “The parties are making the same 
arguments that were made in State v. Ward
. . . . We follow our decision in that case, 
overrule the State’s sole assignment of 
error, and affirm.” (citation omitted). 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 2 “In a single assignment, Wagoner 
contends the statute as applied to him in 
this case is unconstitutional. We agree.” 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 6 “This court has recently determined that, 
to the extent that R.C. 2919.25 extended 
its protection to ‘a person living as a 
spouse,’ it was rendered unconstitutional 
by the Defense of Marriage amendment, 
which became effective on December 2, 
2004. For the reasons set forth in Ward, 
the State’s argument is without merit.”
(citation omitted). 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 6 “This court has recently determined that, 
to the extent that R.C. 2919.25 extended 
its protection to ‘a person living as a 
spouse,’ it was rendered unconstitutional 
by the Defense of Marriage amendment, 
which became effective on December 2, 
2004. For the reasons set forth in Ward, 
Newman’s argument is meritorious.”
(citation omitted). 






Ohio App. 3 
Dist. 
¶ 24 “Because the General Assembly has 
recognized the legal status of cohabitants 
through R.C. 2919.25, the statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to heterosexual 
couples who cohabit and have not parented 
any children together.” 






Ohio App. 3 
Dist. 
¶¶ 10, 12 “We have recently addressed this 
argument in State v. McKinley, Logan 
App. No. 8-05-14, 2006-Ohio-2507, and 
found that the Domestic Violence Statute
is unconstitutional when applied to 
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individuals in Shaffer’s position. . . . 
Therefore, in accordance with our ruling in 
McKinley, Shaffer’s first assignment of 
error is sustained.” 






Ohio App. 3 
Dist. 
¶ 27 “We conclude that the ‘person living as a 
spouse’ provision of R.C. 2919.25 does 
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Ohio App. 8 
Dist. 
¶ 1 “Although Williams and the victim were 
unmarried and cohabited, we found that 
the victim also qualified as a ‘family or 
household member’ because she and 
Williams had a child together. 
Consequently, it is not necessary to 
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Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶¶ 12-13 “Defendant points out in his Reply Brief 
that, shortly after he entered his guilty 
pleas on March 7, 2005, the same trial 
court judge held R.C. 2919.25 
unconstitutional for the reasons on which 
Defendant relies. Perhaps the court would 
have held likewise had Defendant Puckett 
raised the issue. However, that the trial 
court so found in Steineman does not 
make the alleged error “obvious” for 
purposes of Barnes. To be obvious, the 
nature and effect of the error must be 
manifestly apparent and undeniable, not 
merely a basis for contention. That is not 
the case here. Defendant Puckett entered 
pleas of guilty to all the charges against
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      him, and a guilty plea is a complete 
admission of the defendant’s guilt. For 
that reason, and because the alleged plain 
error is not one which was obvious, we 
believe the sound and orderly 
administration of justice supports an 
exercise of our discretion to decline to 
review the error assigned.” (citations
omitted). 






Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 3 “The State argues the Marriage 
Amendment does not render R.C. 
2919.25(A) unconstitutional and in any 
event it has no application to Pelfrey since 
his conduct and conviction preceded the 
effective date of the Marriage 
Amendment. . . . We agree[.]” 




Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 
¶ 6 “[Hill] has waived this argument [a 
constitutional challenge to the domestic 
violence law, based on the Marriage 
Amendment] on appeal.” 






Ohio App. 12 
Dist. 
¶¶ 9-10 “Appellant also argues that his counsel 
should have informed him that Section 11, 
Article XV of the Ohio Constitution, 
Ohio’s ‘Defense of Marriage’ amendment, 
might render the domestic violence statute 
unconstitutional as applied to him. 
However, this court recently ruled that 
Section 11, Article XV does not render the 
domestic violence statute unconstitutional 
as applied to individuals such as appellant, 
who was unmarried but cohabiting with 
the victim at the time of the crime. 
Therefore, we reject appellant’s argument 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to inform him of a potential 
defense. Because the defense appellant 
refers to is not a valid defense, there was 
no prejudice.” (citation omitted).  
 
* The absence of a written opinion in these cases, along with a certain opacity in the relevant appellate 
decision, leaves it unclear exactly how the trial court disposed of the constitutional issue before it. But 
because the defendant was convicted under the domestic violence statute, the statute (I am assuming) could 
not have been struck down as unconstitutional.  
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